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ABSTRACT
The Role of Context in Metaphor Comprehension
(May 1986)
Makiko Shinjo, B.S., Kyoto University of
Industrial Arts and Textile Fibers
B.A., Bentley College, M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jerome L. Myers
The role of context in metaphor comprehension was inves-
tigated. Schematic view focused on the effect of contextual
support in general on metaphor comprehension, while semantic
view emphasized semantic relations between the metaphor
ground and an active concept in memory prior to metaphor
comprehension. In two norming studies comprehension diffi-
culy of metaphors with or without context was ratec.
Reading times for metaphors were measured with or without
sentential context in two experiments.
The semantic priming did not affect the following metap-
hor comprehension in the presence of supportive sentential
context. When the context was removed, the primes showed
significant effects. Two primes interfered with target
comprehension while one prime facilitated it slightly. The
effects of primes on literal comprehension were strikingly
similar to those on metaphor comprehension. A possible
mechanism for the effect of each prime was discussed in
detail
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Diff£I£nt view s of metaphoi
What is a metaphor? My pocket-size Webster's Hew World
Dictionary gives a vague definition of a metaphor: a
metaphor is a figure of speech in which one thing is spoken
of as if it were another. A standard dictionary definition
is that a metaphor is a word or phrase applied to an object
or concept that it uoes not literally denote. This non-
literalness is the first and most important requirement for
something to be a metaphor. However, what is not literally
true does not necessarily constitute a metaphor.
The meaning of "literal truth" is actually two-fold; one
is the literalness value of a sentence, the other is the
truth value of the sentence content. A sentence can be
literal or non-literal quite inaependent of its contextual
meaningf ulne ss. Thus we need to consider three classes of
sentences; the literal and contextually meaningful (most
common sentences), the non-literal and contextually
meaningful (metaphor), and the literal and contextually
anomalous (anomalous sentences). Though a mechanical
combination of two independent conditions suggests the
fourth category, the non-literal and undifferentiated from
the third.
Therefore, what is not literally true can be either a
1
2metaphor or an anomalous sentence. in order to separate
metaphors from literally false, anomalous sentences, Ortony
(1979) suggested a second requirement for metaphors: there
is an intended meaning to be recognized in a metaphor while
an anomalous sentence does not convey any meaning to be
recognized in the frame of the context.
As the metaphor is one case of an indirect speech form,
what is truly asserted in a metaphor differs from what the
sentence literally means. This dissociation of the asserted
meaning from the literal meaning should not be random,
otherwise the metaphor can not be an effective communication
form. The fact is that the metaphor is widely used not only
as one form of rhetoric in literature but also as a common
form of expression in everyday language. Then what is the
underlying relation between the literal and asserted meaning
of a metaphor? Black (1962) has described three approaches
in explaining this relation: the substitution view, the
comparison view, and the interaction view.
The traditional substitution view treats metaphor as a
kind of error in diction and logic. This view explains away
the raetaphoric predicate in a metaphor (the vehicle) as an
error and ignores the role of the metaphorical subject (the
topic). For example, the sentence "A BASIC program is
spaghetti." is considered to be a case of misclassif ication
of a computer program as food. This sentence can nor oe
literally true; however, it has some recognizable meaning,
namely that the structure of a BASIC program can be very
3entangled. We need to substitute a literal property of the
literal referent of the predicate, a kind of food, for the
intended metaphorical property, entangledne ss, in order to
understand the assertion of this metaphor. According to
this view, a metaphor is understood best when the properties
asserted of its topic are already very clear. However, it
is not necessarily true of all metaphors that comprehension
is so effortless.
The comparison view treats a metaphor as a well-
structured comparison of two domains of knowledge of the
topic and the vehicle. This view ascribes equal importance
to the topic and the vehicle in the comprehension of a
metaphor. In this view, a metaphor is considered to be as
an incompleted simile without the preposition "like". The
above example of a BASIC program being spaghetti is
presupposed to have an underlying expression that a BASIC
program is like spaghetti. In the comparison view, this
metaphor means that spaghetti and a BASIC program are
similar in that both have the property of being entangled.
This view, unlike the substitution view, offers a clearer
explanation of how two apparently dissociated levels of
meaning are actually connected through a shared property,
the ground of a metaphor. Its implication for a process
model of metaphor comprehension is clear: a shared property
of the topic and the vehicle is sought in order to achieve a
sentence interpretation. But imagine how complicated
comprehension should be in this view when there is very
little similarity between the topic and the vehicle.
The third view of the metaphor, the interaction view,
was espoused by Black in his thesis. This view argues that
the topic and vehicle play distinct roles: they no longer
have symmetrical roles in the comprehension process. Accor-
ding to this view, the dominant feature associated with the
vehicle is to be attached to the topic, altering the topic's
system of implications. Using our meager BASIC program-
spaghetti example again, the property of ent angl edne s s of
the spaghetti is to be attached to the BASIC program when
this metaphor is comprehended. At the same time, the
salience of the entangledne ss of the BASIC program is enhan-
ced relative to the other features associated with it.
Black (1962) characterized this process as a "filtering" of
the topic by the vehicle. These asymmetrical roles of the
topic and nhe vehicle created a renewed interest in metapnor
in the discipline of psychology as they held a rich implica-
tion for a process model of metaphor comprehension.
Particularly after Tversky (1977) published his influential
article on features of similarity, the hypothesis of
asymmetrical roles has been widely tested in the rigorous
experimental tradion of the information processing school
(Connor & Kogan, 1980; Kroll et al., 1982; Halgady &
Johnson, 1980; Ortony et al., 1985; Verbrugge, 1979;
Verbrugge & McCarrell, 1979).
Verbrugge (1979) proposed a fourth view of the metaphor,
5criticizing Black's interaction view on several counts. He
emphasized the importance of the perceptual experience of
this knowledge-system transformation which co-occurs with
the comprehension of a metaphor. His intention in doing so
was to avoid the heavy dependence on abstract meaning repre-
sentation which is one of the characteristics of the
comparison and interaction views. Another distinctive
characteristic of his transformation view is its
specification of the extent to which the knowledge-system of
the topic is transformed. An underlying assumption in this
view is that a metaphor puts constraints on structural
identity and on transformations in which two structures can
participate.
According to Verbrugge's transformation view of
metaphor, to comprehend a metaphor is to perceive familiar
structures or transformations in an unusual context. In
this view, our program -spaghetti metaphor can mean that
invariants of spaghetti apply to the BASIC program: the
property of the program is modified by the property of the
spaghetti. This modulating process is hypothesized to be no
different than the process evoked by an adjective or a
class-membership modifier in a literal sentence. This claim
distinguished the transformation view from other views,
asserting the similarity of the metaphor comprehension mec-
hanism to that of a literal sentence.
Dif f e_rent classes of metaphox
G
Four different views of metaphor have been introduced
here, yet we have encountered only one example of a metaphor
so far, i.e., "A BASIC program is spaghetti." Then what are
the class of metaphors being studied? Several extensive
taxonomies of metaphor have been presented by Searle (1979),
Hiilec (1979), and Lakoff & Johnson (1980) from philosophi-
cal ana/or linguistic points of view. In empirical studies
of cognitive psychology, the categorization of metaphor is
rather brief and pragmatic. We recognize only a few classes
of metaphor; the first distinction is between the nominative
metaphor and the whole sentence metaphor. A formal compari-
son of these two types of metaphor is not commonly maoe in
the literature of metaphor comprehension perhaps due to the
rare utilization of the whole sentence metaphor; neverthe-
less a distinction is in order because of their different
implication for process models.
The nominative metaphor has been popularly used in
conjunction with testing hypotheses about feature similarity
between the topic and the vehicle (Gildea & Glucksberg,
1983; Glucksberg et al., 1982; Marschark & Hunt, 1 985 ;
Ortony et al., 1985) Cur BASIC p r og r am- spagh e t t i example
belongs to this class of metaphor. This class of metaphor
is structured by two nouns, that do not have a category-
instance relation between them.
The use of w hoi e- sentence metaphors was first proposed
7o r
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by Ortony (1979) as an alternative, and they were typically
utilized in experiments in which the cole of context in
metaphor comprehension was investigated (Octony et al.,
1978; Inhoff et al., 1984). For example, a whole sentence
metaphor "The troops marched on." can be interpreted diffe-
rently depending on the preceding context. "The troops" may
be a group of soldiers in the context of a battle field,
it may be children in the context of naughty kids annoying
baby si tte r
.
A whole sentence metaphor can be interpreted either
literally or metaphorically, whereas a nominative metaphor
has only a metaphorical interpretation. In this sense, a
whole sentence metaphor meets the first definition of the
metaphor, i.e. non-1 ite ralne ss, only partially, unlike a
nominative metaphor.
When the preceding context promotes a metaphorical
interpretation of a whole sentence metaphor, the topic of
the sentence already requires a metaphorical interpretation
and the vehicle interpretation fellows in accord with the
nature of that interpretation. Here, what is crucial in
achieving a sentential interpretation is the nature of the
interpretation of the topic. The vehicle may or may not
receive a metaphorical interpretation; however, its role in
the sentential interpretation is clearly secondary. In
contrast, a nominative metaphor invariably calls for a lite-
ral interpretation of the topic, and it is the vehicle that
requires a metaphorical interpretation. The latter's cole
in the sentential interpretation is hypothesized to be more
crucial than the former.
In short, the onset of metaphorical interpretation in
the two classes of metaphor is quite different. What is
problematic with a whole sentence metaphor is that this type
of metaphor has two different interpretations: the literal
and the metaphorical. When a context induces a literal
interpretation, people may search for and arrive at only one
interpretation. However, this same sentence may have two
interpretations when a preceding context induces a
metaphorical interpretation: namely, the literal and the
metaphorical. A reaction time difference may arise because
there are two meaning to process in a metaphor and only one
in a literal sentence. Or it may arise because metaphorical
comprehension is truely different from its literal counter-
part. This causes a serious problem for reaction time
studies designed to test whether metaphorical and literal
comprehension processes are different. In contrast, a
nominative metaphor does not have any literal interpreta-
tion; thus the interpretation of reaction time data is
relatively clear. Uo extensive effort has been devoted to
the development of process models for whole sentence metap-
hor comprehension, whereas the nature of the metaphorical
interpretation of the nominative metaphor has been hypothe-
sized ana tested.
The second distinction we encounter among different
9classes of metaphor is one of a dead metaphor and a novel
metaphor (Glucksberg et al., 1982; Gildea & Glucksberg,
1933; Lakoff & Johnson, 1979; Searle, 1979). This distin-
ction depends on the type of vehicle ano its combination
with the topic. An example of a dead metaphor is "Time is
money". This expression has been so commonly used that it
has become idiomatic, and everyone would know its intended
meaning immediately. in contrast, if someone says "That
building is a sun", the intended meaning may not be automa-
tically clear to the hearer. It is hypothesized that a dead
metaphor is understood by people quite differently than a
novel metaphor (Glucksberg et al., 1983). People would
instantly know what is the appropriate feature of a vehicle
to be selected in a dead metaphor, whereas a novel metaphor
may require an effort to find an appropriate feature of the
vehicle to attach to the topic. Perhaps there is a represe-
ntational difference between the two types of vehicles.
Lakoff & Johnson (1979) particularly emphasized the role
of cultural expectation and belief on the production and
comprehension of a metaphor. These factors are influential
in a process in which a novel metaphor becomes a dead metap-
hor over time. If a new metaphor fits the cultural frame
well, there is a tendency for the same metaphor to be used
repeatedly by many people. As a result, a specific feature
of the vehicle becomes more dominant than before. People no
longer need to search for an appropriate feature of the
10
vehicle to attach to the topic. Such extensively used
vehicles are called stock vehicles, and their function in a
metaphor may be very similar to that of an adjective in a
literal sentence.
Another distinction worth noting is the difference bet-
ween simple metaphors and open-ended metaphors (Searle,
1 979; Uarschark & Hunt, 1 985). in some metaphors only one
interpretation may be available, whereas in others several
interpretations are immediately available. For example, a
metaphor "Sam is an elephant." may mean that Sam is big or
that Sam never forgets, given that Sam is specified as a
human oeing. The process involved in the comprehension of
simple and open-ended metaphor may be the same. But an
immediate implication here is that an open-ended metaphor
may require a longer time for comprehension because several
meanings must be processed.
Dimension_§ of metaphojc
Rather than imposing abstract and arbitrary dichotomous
categories, some researchers have developed scales to
measure metaphors. A recent work by tlarschark & Hunt (1 985)
has summarized 10 attribute dimensions that are of current
theoretical interest in metaphor research.
The dimension of felt familiarity maps continuously on
the dichotomous distinction between a dead metaphor and a
novel metaphor. The comprehensibil ity scale allows us to
11
compare decrees of difficulty with which different metaphors
are understood. They are useful in deriving a prediction
for reaction time studies. So is the dimension of the
estimated number of alternative interpretations: perhaps the
more interpretations a metaphor has, the longer time it may
take to be understood, if all possible meanings are
calculated obligatorily. This dimension captures the clas-
sification of a simple and an open-ended metaphor. The
degree of metaphc r ici ty and semantic relatedness of topic
and vehicle may oe measures of particular interest when the
interaction view of a metaphor is being tested. The three
imageabil ity scales, imageability of a metaphor, of the
topic, and of the vehicle, would help clarify the role of
imagery in the comprehension of a metaphor. These scales
may be used to characterize a class of metaphors of
inte re st
.
ilarchark & Hunt (1 985) demonstrated in their study the
importance of the estimated number of alternative interpre-
tations in the recall of a metaphor: the more alternative
interpretations a metaphor has, the more often the metaphor
was recalled. Also the role of topic imageability was
partially credited as a reliable measure of recall performa-
nce: the higher the imageability of the topic, the better
the recall of the metaphor.
These ten dimensions have been gradually developed by
many researchers over a decade in the hope of finaing
12
factors to guide the study of metaphor comprehension.
Johnson (1930) suggested that comprehending and appreciating
a metaphor would require two different processes. it
appears that nine dimensions are closely related to the
process of comprehension, and the last dimension, the good-
ness of a metaphor, may be related to the appreciation
process. This scale is still very broad and general in
meaning. An effort has been made to define what makes a
metaphor a good metaphor, searching for systematic relations
among the attribute dimensions (Tourangeau & Sternberg,
1 981 ) .
The comprehension process has received the most
attention. As a result, a variety of theories have diverged
on the issues of the representation and comprehension of
metaphors. It is this issue that we now turn to briefly.
Model s fox metapho_r comprehension
The traditional three-stage model of metaphor comprehen-
sion was first proposed by Searle (1 969, 1 979). In the
first stage people achieve a literal interpretation of a
metaphor; then in the second, they check this interpretation
against the context. Literal and metaphorical processes are
exactly the same until this point. The only difference is
that the literal interpretation of a metaphor falls outside
the contextual frame, and people have to reinterpret the
metaphor nonliterally in the third stage.
13
This model appealed to many researchers because it ex-
plicatea the status of metaphor comprehension relative to
its literal counterpart. However, reaction time studies
designed to test this model generally have failed to support
it. Consistent findings of no difference in response time
measures led many to hypothesize that there is perhaps only
one comprehension process for literal and metaphorical sen-
tences (Glucksberg et al., 1982; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1 983 ;
Inhoff et al, 1 984; tiiller, 1 979; Paivio, 1 979).
Hoffman & Kemper (1985) have argued that models for
metaphor comprehension are not sufficiently constrained to
test the hypothesis of dual comprehension mechanisms for
metaphors and literal sentences. A longer reaction latency
in comprehending a metaphor than in comprehending a literal
sentence may be interpreted in two ways. The first inter-
pretation is that the two mechanisms of comprehension are
essentially the same and there are only two stages in both
of them; namely people achieve a sentential interpretation
in the first stage of any sentence, and they check it
against the context in the second stage. As a metaphor is
more difficult to understand, the first stage for a senten-
tial interpretation may take a longer time for a metaphor
than for a literal sentence, resulting in overall longer
latencies for metaphors. The alternative interpretation of
a longer reaction time is that metaphor comprehension indeed
involves an extra stage. This interpretation assumes that
14
there ace different mechanisms for literal and metaphorical
comprehension, without further specifications of the two
models, critical tests are difficult to construct. Thus at
present, both models appear equally plausible.
Psychological approaches to the comprehension of metap-
hor (and possibly of literal language) can be dividea into
two groups in terms of their underlying representational
system. One approach focuses on the feature similarity in
the abstract representation (Glucksberg et al., 1982; Gildea
& Glucksberg; 1983; Ortony, 1979). The representation in
this approach is said to be semantic, with the feature as a
fundamental unit of representation (McCloskey & Glucksberg,
1979; Smith, 1978; Smith et al., 1974; Tversky, 1977; and
Ortony, 1979, specifically on the representation of metap-
hor). Many studies of metaphor comprehension are explicitly
or implicitly based on these representational assumptions.
Some researchers have theorized that the abstract represen-
tation is not the sole mediation for metaphor comprehension.
The second approach answers this criticism by taking
imagery into account (Marschark & Hunt, 1935; Paivio, 1 979;
Verbrugge, 1979; etc). Though no adherent of this approach
claims that imagery is the sole mediatior in metaphor
comprehension, some ascribe a cr eater role to imagery
(Verbrugge & McCarrel, 1977) than the others (Paivio, 1 979;
Hacschack & Hunt, 1985).
Regardless of one's preference for the type of mediation
in the comprehension process, it is largely agreed that
15
there is one common comprehension process for literal and
metaphorical statements. Therefore, despite the apparent
disagreement on the issue of representation, the process
models conceived by the two approaches are almost identical:
perhaps metaphors are understood in the same way as literal
expressions are. What makes metaphors different from lite-
ral expressions may be the difficulty people have in under-
standing unfamiliar metaphors. what is this difficulty and
how it affects comprehension mechanism? The investigation
of metaphor comprehension appears to be a promising approach
to studying the language comprehension mechanism in general.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN METAPHOR COMPREHENSION
It is known that people can tell metaphors from literal
expressions and that they can decide what is a good metaphor
and what is not with considerable agreement (Glucksberg et
al., 1932; Tcurangeau & Sternberg, 1981). However, some
sentences can be interpreted either literally or metaphori-
cally (Ortony, 1 979a). Some metaphors have more than one
possible interpretation (Searle, 1979; Mar schar k & Hunt,
1985). Furthermore, some metaphors are understood easily in
isolation while others are not (Glucksberg et al., 1 982).
People need the guidance of context in deciding what is
meant by some metaphors.
Theorists have emphasized the importance of the context
in the comprehension of metaphor (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983;
Ortony, 1980; Searle, 1979). A word meaning is not contex-
tually invariant; rather an appropriate meaning is largely-
dependent on the contextual frame. Apprehension of the
appropriate meaning is largely a function of linguistic and
e xt r al ingui st ic cues in the preceding context (Malgady &
Johnson, 1980). This is especially the case when a sentence
is relatively hard to understand.
16
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Schema arjd m£tapho_r. com^ieijej] sj.o.n
In explaining the ease or. difficulty of metaphor compre-
hension, Ortony et al.(1973) focused on the sufficiency of
the preceding context from a schematic point of view. if
the context has provided enough information to activate an
appropriate schema, later sentences will be understood easi-
ly in its frame. If not, subsequent comprehension will
suffer (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Haviland & Clark, 1974).
Schema theory predicted the same context effect on the
comprehension of metaphor and literal expressions.
Ortony et al.(1978) reported that metaphors were as
quickly understood as literal sentences when the context was
long, but that metaphors required longer times to comprehend
than literals when the context was insufficient. They
concluded that when the context provided sufficient informa-
tion, metaphor comprehension occured essentially in the same
way as literal comprehension. However, when the context was
impoverished metaphor comprehension required more time.
Inhoff et al.(1 985) noted that Ortony et al.'s short
contexts provided meaningful frames for the comprehension of
literal targets, but they were anomalous in relation to the
metaphorical targets. They introduced a control condition
in which a literal target was preceeded by an unrelated
context. They concluded from their study that metaphor
comprehension with an insufficient context may have been
similar to literal comprehension with an unrelated context.
18
These two studies (Inhoff et al., 1984; Ortony et
al.,1978) have shown that a metaphor may be comprehended
differently when a context is long and presumably sufficient
to support a metaphorical interpretation than when a context
is short and insufficient. Was this because of the dual
meaning of their metaphors?: Were people calculating two
meanings in the short context condition because the context
does not clearly direct them to one meaning? Or were
people actually doing something different in comprehension
of a metaphor depending on the amount of contextual informa-
tion?
These two studies were designed more to investigate the
difference between literal and metaphorical comprehension
processes than to explore the question of what in context
facilitates metaphor comprehension. Their results showed
the importance of relations between the context and the
subsequent metaphorical sentences, and suggested that
tighter control should be exerted over these relations. Yet
the questions still remained largely unanswered: how do
literal and metaphorical comprehension differ and how does
the context facilitate the comprehension of metaphors?
19
Feature similarity arid me.ta£l}0£ comprehension
We hypothesized that the comprehension process for meta-
phors has at least two components: one is encoding of the
vehicle which is literally anomalous in relation to the
topic and the preceding context; the other is finding an
appropriate connection between the vehicle and the topic and
the whole preceding context in turn. The first component is
not specific to the comprehension of metaphor; it is a
purely lexical process without facilitation from the prece-
ding context. The second component is more interesting,
because it contains the key that may differentiate metaphor
comprehension process from its literal counterpart.
Although it is generally assumed that both comprehension
processes are qualitatively the same, the issue has not been
settled due to the lack of adequate evidence. Thus keeping
the possibility of different processes in mind for the time
being, let us now turn to this second component of the
comprehension process. It is this component on which our
discussion will focus for the rest of this paper.
A detailed model for the metaphor comprehension process
is no more available than for its literal counterpart;
however, a possible difference between literal and metaphor
comprehension processes has been suggested by Ortony (1979).
There is only a slight feature overlap between the topic and
the vehicle of a metaphor and it is hard to recognize, thus
difficult to utilize in sentential interpretation. In
20
contrast, a feature overlap between subject ana predicate of
a literal sentence is easy to detect. Ortony hypothesized
that this difference in the amount of feature overlap makes
metaphor comprehension somewhat different from its literal
counterpart
.
Various researchers have hypotnesized and tested models
for judgments of trie similarity of two nouns (e.g.,
ticCloskey £ Glucksberg, 1 979; Smith et al. f 1 97 4 ; Tversky,
1977). Invariably they have assumed that a judgment would
be based on the relative amount of feature overlap between
the two nouns against some criteria. in the case cf metap-
hors, the amount cf feature overlap between the topic ana
the vehicle is very small. This particular property of
metaphors would pose a serious problem for the feature
comparison mechanism which is presumably necessary to
achieve a meaningful joint interpretation of words (Tversky,
1 977).
Context may aid the comprehension cf metaphors by making
an appropriate feature of the vehicle (the ground of a
metaphor) more salient (Gildea £ Glucksberg, 1933; Hoffman S
Kemper, 1935). There are two possible reasons for this
effect: (1) increased saliency of the ground may induce a
faster selection of the appropriate feature from the feature
list cf the vehicle. (2) The ground feature, which has very
low dominance among the features of the topic (Ortony,
1979), may also become more salient; therefore, it may
21
become easier to connect the topic and the vehicle through
the ground. Thus, increased saliency of the ground may
affect either the selection of the ground or the integration
of two words or both. This first factor may be peculiar to
the comprehension of a metaphor, while the second factor
may affect comprehension of metaphoric and literal language
as well (Foss, 1932; Foss & Ross, 1933; Paivio, 1979). The
first factor peculiar to metaphor comprehension may lead us
to either two separate models for literal and metaphorical
comprehension, or to a single process model in which a
metaphor may be under stooo slower than a literal sentence.
MiLgct 0£ semantic; activation
Glucksberg et al.(1982) developed a metaphor interferen-
ce paradigm in which subjects were asked to decide whether a
sentence was literally true or not. They used four kinds of
sentences: standard-true, standard-false, metaphor, and
scrambled metaphor. The subjects were slower to make lite-
ralness judgments for metaphors than for scrambled metaphors
despite the fact that both type of sentences were equally
false literally. Sentence examples are as follows.
22
Metaphor some jobs are jails. (DSome roads are snakes. (2)
Scrambled some jobs are snakes. (3)Metaphor some roads are jails. (4)
Glucksberg et al.(1982) argued that the difference in
the time between judgments of literalness for metaphors
(1,2) and scrambled metaphors (3,4) was due to the metapho-
rical interpretation of the former (1,2) which was apprehen-
ded as meaningful although it was literally false. They
hypothesized that this metaphorical truth interfered with
the literal falseness and slowed the subjects' response.
Gilaea & Glucksberg (1983) used a group of metaphors
which were hard to understand in isolation; i.e., they had
not shown the metaphor interference effect in the previous
experiment. They prepared three kinds of priming sentences
to be presented just prior to these difficult metaphors.
The priming sentences differed in their relation to the
ground of the metaphor. For example, their primes for a
metaphor "Marriages are iceboxes." (5) are:
Specific-Figurative (SF) People are COLD. (6)
Specific-Literal (SL) Winters are COLD. (7)
General-Literal (GL) Summers are WARM. (8)
These sentences were actually preceeded by "some" or "all"
in their experiment. Which sentence had which quantifier is
unclear in their report.
Here the concept of coldness was presumably the ground
of the metaphor (5). The two specific primes (6,7) used
this word as predicates of sentences, whereas the general
23
prime (8) used a concept of a different value within the
same semantic field (e.g. WARM) as the predicate. when
there was no prime preceded a metaphor, it was judged to be
literally false as fast as a scrambled metaphor. when a
metaphor followed a prime, a latency in literalness judgment
was longer significantly compared to when its scrambled
counterpart followed a prime. All three type of primes
(6,7,8) interfered more with the literalness judgment of
metaphors than with scrambled metaphors. Gildea &
Glucksberg found no significan effect of the prime type.
Therefore they concluded that activation of the semantic
field of the metaphor ground facilitated the comprehension
of a metaphor, slowing the literalness judgment in turn.
The issue of the relative effectiveness of the three
primes (5F,SL,GL) was of particular interest. The first
hypothesis investigated by Gildea & Glucksberg (1533) in
relation to this issue was whether the representation of
figurative and literal meanings are separate from each
other. They reasoned that if they are separate, then the
effects of figurative and literal primes should be diffe-
rent. Consequently, the SF prime should be more effective
than the SL prime, because the former directly activates the
ground, whereas the latter does not. An alternative view of
the representation of the meaning may be that there is some
core meaning common to both literal and figurative meanings,
and priming one meaning would sufficiently activate the
other throuch this core concept. It follows that both types
24
of primes would be equally effective.
The implication of different meaning representations is
not limited to the issue of the representation. It has been
hypothesized that there are two different comprehension
processes, figurative ana literal (Searle, 1979). The
comparison between the two types of primes also taps this
issue of the difference in processes. if there are diffe-
rent comprehension strategies, the figurative primes may
induce subjects to be more prepared for subsequent metapho-
rical comprehension than literal primes may. Inhoff at
al.(1985) presented data which can be interpreted as suppor-
ting this hypothesis.
There was another issue about the primes adaressed in
Gildea & Glucksber's study: if a prime is to activate the
semantic field of the metaphor ground, how specific need a
prime be? This issue was investigated by comparing the SL
and GL prin.es (e.g. COLD vs WARM).
In Gildea u Glucksberg's experiments, the three primes
(SF, SL, ana GL) were equally effective. This result suppo-
rted the view that there is a core concept common tc literal
and figurative meaning and the process of comprehension for
literal and figurative language is essentially the same.
Furthermore, their data supported the conclusion that as
long as the same semantic field is primed, the specific
value of the priming feature does not affect the magnitude
of the facilitative effect.
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However, the bulk of studies on the effect of semantica-
lly related words (e.g. Conrac, 1 974; Fischler, 1 977 ;
Swinney, 1979; Whitney et al., 1935) concluded that a
priming word activates a related concept of the target word.
The degree of the activation may be a function of how close-
ly two words are related through the common concept (Collins
& Loftus, 1975; Lorch, 1982; Simpson, 1981; Warren, 1974).
Then the relative effectiveness of the primes should be in
the descending order of SL and GL.
Gildea & Glucksberg (1933) reportec this study with a
reservation about its generalizability because their metap-
hor interference task was quite different from normal
reading. For one thing, people do not read a text in order
to decide the literal truthfulness of each sentence. For
another, what they read in normal circumstances is not a
group of unrelated sentences; there is a theme or topic
which combines sentences in a meaningful fashion. It is
also known that people develop a strategy specific to some
decision task (Holy oak & Glass, 1975; Seidenberg et al.,
1934). It is possible that the existence of universal and
existential quantifiers in Gildea a Glucksberg' s study may
have encouraged subjects to develop a strategy specific to
their task.
Gildea & Glucksberg's conclusion about what constitutes
a minimal appropriate context was stated within the limits
of their task. We do not know yet if their result was
largely due to their judgment task and the specific material
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or if it can be generalized to normal treading,
CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTS
In the fit st experiment we hoped to investigate three
issues: (1) Does semantic activation of the ground feature
facilitate the comprehension of a metaphor in a laboratory
reading task? (2) Do different primes differ in the magni-
tude of their facilitation? This question has two parts:
(a) Do literal and metaphorical comprehension differ with
respect to their representation and mechanism? (b) Does
specifying the metaphor ground facilitate comprehension more
than merely activating the semantic field of the ground in
gene ral
?
Our subjects read a meaningful context which consisted
of a few sentences. The last sentence of each context
served as a priming sentence, ending with a prime word.
Instead of using anomalous sentences (scrambled metaphors),
a fourth category of priming sentence was used as a base
line; this class of priming sentence did not include any
word semantically associated to the vehicle of a target
metaphor (Neutral sentence, hereafter abbreviated as M) . We
also included literal paraphrases of target metaphors as a
possible base for comparison. An example is shown below.
Dob and Mary's marriage was ending.
They seldom talked to each other these days.
The happy past was a fading memory.
She remembered the first time they met.
She had been feeling unhappy then,
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(SF)
(SL)
(GL)
(N)
because people around her were COLD,because that winter was very COLD,because that summer was very HOTbecause people aound her were sad.
Now, her marriage was an icebox.
Low, her marriage was disastrous.
actual experiment, semant ically related words were
not presented in capital letters.
In this experiment, the subjects' task was to read
sentences for comprehension. The reading time for each
sentence was the measure of comprehension difficulty. If
reading of target metaphors is influenced in the same way as
judgment, then target metaphors should be read faster after
semantically related primes than after unrelated primes
(SF , SL,GIX N)
.
Furthermore, target metaphors after metapho-
rical primes should be read as fast as after literal primes
(SF=SL) if we are to replicate their finding. An alterna-
tive result (SF<SL) would support separate processes and
representations for literal and metaphorical comprehension.
Third, reading times of target metaphors after specific
primes and general primes should be the same (SL=GL) accor-
ding to Gildea & Glucksberg. Finding an alternative result
(SL<GL) would be in accord with the results of studies of
semantic priming.
One other pattern of results is conceivable given Ortony
et a 1 . ( 1 9 7 & ) finding: when a preceding context provided
sufficient information for the target sentence comprehen-
sion, a metaphor was as quickly understood as a literal
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sentence. It follows that when a preceding context suffi-
ciently establishes the ground of the metaphor, semantic
activation by the primes would not affect target comprehen-
sion. Then there should be no difference among the
efficacies of the primes; the semant ical ly related primes-
should offer no advantage over the neutral prime
(SF,SL,GL=N)
.
In our experiment the subjects also engaged in an
immediate cued recall task after they finished reading all
sentences. They were asked to recall the last target sente-
nce given the whole context as a cue. This cued recall task
was to provide a measure of the ease of target sentence
comprehension. If a sentence is well understood in relation
to its context, then the context should serve as a suffi-
cient cue to retrieve the target sentence (Black s Bern,
1981; Keenan et al., 1 984 ; Walker et al., 1 983). Then the
difference in the cued recall probability should reflect
both the differential efficacy of primes as well as the
difference in contextual support. If metaphors are under-
stood less well than literal sentences, this difference
should appear in cued recall, also.
Prior to the reading time experiment, a norming study
was done in order to assess whether there was any systematic
difference in contextual flow as a function of prime type.
This was done in order to simplify the later interpretation
of reading time data as a function of the prime type.
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Itexmina Study.
Method
Objects, Forty-eight University of Massachusetts
undergraduates participated as subjects in partial fulfil-
lment of a course requirement. A norming session was
completed within 20 minutes.
UatJirialiL Each material set consisted of one warm-up
passage, twenty experimental, and twenty filler passages.
The experimental and filler passages were randomly ordered,
and the same order was preserved for all the eight material
sets.
A passage consisted of four to six short sentences with
no systematic difference between the experimental and the
filler material. A typical experimental passage had three
context sentences, a priming sentence, and then a target
sentence. There were four priming conditions: Specific-
Figurative (SF), Specific-Literal (SL), General-Literal
(GL), and Neutral (N). All subjects read five passages in
each prime condition.
Two target conditions, metaphorical (H) and literal (L),
were varied between subjects. Counterbalancing them created
eight material sets. When a subject read all experimental
targets in the metaphor condition, all the last sentences of
filler passages were literal, and vice versa. A subject
read an experimental target in one of eight combinations of
prime and target.
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The experimental passages were derived from the material
used by Gildea S Glucksberg (1983). Their combination of
prime, topic, and vehicle was preserved with minor excep-
tions. Changes were made when a word in their list had a
very low frequency count in the word frequency norm (Kucera
& Francis, 1967), and when it was impossible to smoothly
connect the context to a prime and a target. The universal
and existential quantifiers were not used in our experiment
unless they fit with the preceding context.
Filler passages were different from the experimental
passages in one respect: they did net involve semantic
manipulation. They were used so that a subject would read a
metaphorical last sentence only half of the time. This was
done to discourage subjects from developing a strategy
specific to this experimental situation. hs the filler
passages did not involve the prime manipulation of interest,
the ratings of filler passages were not included in the
statistical analysis.
PXOcedu_re_1. Subjects were run in groups of four to
eight. The passages were printed in a booklet with brief
instructions on the front page. Subjects were instructed to
read the passages in order and were told that there were no
relations among passages. Each passage was printed on a
separate page with an instruction to rate the difficulty
with which the last sentence was comprehended given the
preceding context. Subjects circled a number ranging from 1
to 5 to indicate the difficulty they felt in comprehending
the last sentence; a value of 1 denoted "not difficult", and
5 denoted "very difficult".
R£ sul t s and di scussion
The results of the norming study ace shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Difficulty in Target Sentence Comprehension
as a Function of Target and Prime
Target type SF
Prime
SL
type
GL H Average
tletaphc r 2.242 2.250 2.550 2 .550 2 .398
Lite r al 2.200 2.175 2.400 1 .917 2.173
Ave rage 2.221 2.212 2.328 2 .233 2 .286
Subjects judged that the metaphor sentences were slig-
htly more difficult to comprehend than the literal sentences
even after the context provided general knowledge of each
episode. Although this trend was consistent in every prime
condition, the overall effect of the target sentence type
was not statistically significant (F (1 ,38) =2.11 7 , P>0.25).
The prime did not have a systematic effect on the diffi-
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culty with which the target sentences were understood
(F(3,36)=1.913, P> 0 .15). However, subjects judged a literal
target sentence easier to understand following a neutral
prime than following other primes (t (l f 19)-3.118, P<0.05,
using Bonferroni t-statistics for planned comparisons). The
reason why subjects felt that the literal-neutral condition
was particularly easy to understand was unclear. This trend
was not observed when the target sentence was a metaphor.
Rather, a metaphorical target after a neutral prime was
judged to be more difficult than after other primes,
although this trend was not significant. This variation in
difficulty ratings for metaphorical target sentences paral-
leled the magnitude of the semantic relationship between the
prime and target sentences.
Because the prime affected metaphorical target comprehe-
nsion differently than literal target sentences, the intera-
ction of the target and the prime was significant
(F(3,17)=3.975, P<0.02). The norming study provided
evidence that the context was equally supportive of target
sentence comprehension regardless of the prime. If reading
times of target sentences show the same pattern as the
ratings, target sentence reading times should be unaffected
by the primes. One possible exception is that a literal
target after a neutral prime may be read faster than in
other conditions. The other possible effect is that a
literal target may be read faster than a metaphorical
ta rget
.
An alternative view is that reading tir.es of target
sentences rpay not reflect the pattern in the difficulty
ratings. The reading time measure may be more sensitive to
the semantic manipulation than the eatings. if this is
true, then the reading times should reflect the magnitude of
semantic relations between prime and target.
Similarly, if the cued-recall task is to reflect the
pattern in the ratings, then there should be no effect of
prime on recall probabilites of target sentences. If cued-
recall task is sensitive to the semantic manipulation, then
it should shew the effect of semantic relations as a
function cf the prime.
Experiment 1
ii£ thod
SJJjjjectSj. Sixty-four University of !«la ssachusett s
undergraduates participated in the experiment in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement.
L^texialSj, The same materials were usee as in the
norming study. Three additional passages were written and a
total of four passages were used in practice trials at the
beginning of each experimental session.
Procedure. Subjects were run individual ly. The presen-
tation cf each passage began with a word "READY" on a video
monitor screen at the position where the first word of each
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sentence would appear. Subjects pressed a trigger to
initiate the presentation of a passage. All materials were
displayed sentence by sentence on the video monitor which
was controlled by a Zenith Z1C0 microcomputer. Reading of
each sentence was self-paced. Subjects were instructed to
press the response trigger as soon as they understood a
sentence. Reading times for each sentence were automatical-
ly recorded by the computer.
Comprehension questions followed half of the passages;
10 of them were about the experimental passages, the rest
were about the filler passages. These questions typically
required recall of an early part of the context sentences.
This was done to ensure that subjects read sentences for
comprehension and to discourage subjects from pressing the
trigger without comprehending sentences. Subjects orally
answered "Yes" cr "Ho" through an intercom which connected
the subject room and the experimental room. The experimen-
ter in the experimental room gave feedback to subjects and
recorded their answers. Then a row of asterisks appeared in
the center of the video monitor for two second, and then
another "READY" signal replaced it to indicate the start of
a new passage. Subjects required approximately 20 minutes
to read the entire material and answer comprehension ques-
tions.
After the reading task, subjects were given a booklet
with instructions to write down everything they could remem-
ber about the last sentence of each passage. On each page
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of the booklet a passage without the last sentence was
printed as a recall cue. This cuecl-recall task typically
required 20 minutes to complete. The recall protocols yiel-
ded two sets of data: percentage verbatim recall ana percen-
tage gist recall.
Result s
£eadincs times,. Three out of sixty-four subjects who
gave five or more wrong answers to probe questions were
replaced. Reading time data were trimmed using two rules:
(1) any reading time which exceeded an average reading time
for an indiviaual by more than three standard deviations was
not used in the later analysis (14 out of 1 280
, 1.904%). (2)
any reading time longer than 5000 msec was also omitted from
a further analysis (16 out of 1280, 1 .250%). A total of 27
reading times (2.109%) were discaraed from the data, and the
corresponding recall data were also thrown out. There was
no systematic trend in the way the data points were discar-
ded. The average reading times of the target sentence as a
function of the target and the prime are shown in Table 2.
An analysis of variance was carried out on these results
using' error terms based on subject variance and item varian-
ce (Fl and F2, respectively).
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Table 2
Reading Times (in msec) of Target Sentence
as a Function of Target and Prime
in Experiment 1
Targer type SF
Prime
SL
type
GL N Ave rage
Metaphor 1941 2010 1926 1998 1969
Lite r al 134 5 1394 1906 1859 1876
Ave rage 1 893 1952 1916 1928 1922
The metaphorical target sentences were read slower than
their literal paraphrases, and this was true for all prime
types. This result was similar to that ooserved in the
difficulty ratings. However, just as this effect was not
significant in the difficulty ratings, it was also not
significant in reading times (F1,F2<1).
There was virtually no effect of the prime on the
reading time of a target sentence (F1,F2<1). Nor were any
of the subsequent pairwise comparisons among different
primes significant. Having a semantically related word in a
priming sentence did not speed up target comprehension.
It was conceivable that comprehension of each prime
sentence affected the target sentence reading time differen-
tly. In order to test this possibility, reading times of
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prime sentences were analyzed. Table 3 shows mean reading
times for each prime type.
Table 3
Mean Reading Times (in msec) of
in Experiment 1
Prime Sentence
Prime type
SF SL GL N
2163 21 36 21 67 2010
There was some indication that the neutral primes (N)
were processed more quickly than other primes
(tl (1 ,59) =4.449
,
P<0.01). It is possible that a part of the
target reading time reflected continued processing of the
previous sentence. O'Brien & Myers (1935) have presented
evidence for such spillover effects: reading times of sente-
nces were longer when a preceding sentence was difficult to
understand than when a preceding sentence was easy. If this
is the case here, then a possible facilitative effect of the
semantically related primes (SF,SL,GL) might have been
cancelled by the greater spillover effect from these same
pr ime s.
An analysis of covariance was done on the target senten-
ce reading time to examine this possibility; the covariate
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was pdmt sentence reading times. Even after adjusting for
the effect of the prime sentence reading time, the effect of
the prime was not significant (P>0.30). This further suppo-
rted the conclusion that semantic activation did not affect
target comprehension.
Eecali,. Each target sentence was scored for two points,
one for the topic (or subject in a literal sentence) and the
other for the vehicle (predicate). The verbatim recall
probabilities were obtained by dividing actual points by the
maximum possible points. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Cued-Recall Probabilities of Target Sentence
as a Function of Target and Prime
(verbatim recall)
Prime type
Target type SF SL GL N Ave rage
tletapho r 0.43 0.43 0.4 3 0.42 0.43
Lite r al 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.37
Ave rage 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40
It can be seen that the metaphorical sentences were
recalleo more often than their literal paraphrases. This
result is reasonable given the fact that subjects attended
longer to a metaphorical target than to a literal target.
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However, this effect on the target recall probaoility was
not significant (PI (1 ,59) =2.232, P> 0 .10, F2 (1 , 38) =1 .411
,
P>0.20). There was no effect of the prime on the probabili-
ty of target sentence cued-recall: PI, F2<1. a subsequent
analysis of percent gist recall produced the same pattern.
Subjects often added a preposition "like" in front of
the vehicle when they recalled a metaphorical target senten-
ce. This indicated that people were aware of the difference
between literal and metaphorical sentences.
Di £ c u s s i o n
In contrast to Gildea a Glucksberg's (1903) finding, the
semantically related primes had no effect on target compre-
hension in our experiment. This is true for both metaphori-
cal and literal targets. There are two possible reasons why
the prime did not affect target comprehension in our experi-
ment: (1) Gildea & Glucksberg's finding was specific to
their experimental paradigm (i.e. literalness judgment); (2)
when the context sets up the ground for subsequent metaphor
comprehension, semantic relations did not add a further
facilitative effect.
Gildea & Glucksberg's experiment was different from ours
on several counts. It is possible that their judgment task
and our reading task involve different mechanisms, and are
thus susceptible to different factors. Their materials were
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also different from ours. in their experiment, metaphorical
targets may have been understooa differently when they
followed prime sentences, because the prime sentences they
used were syntactically different from the rest of their
material (Noun + Adjective and noun + noun, respectively).
Though there is no evidence that an adjectival sentence
creates more spillover effect than a noun sentence, it is
conceivable that subjects slowed down in their judgment of a
metaphor after reading a prime sentence simply because they
had to read a different kind of sentence. Therefore it
could have boosted the effect of the primes on the literal-
ness judgment of a metaphor.
Another possible reason for the difference between
Gildea & Glucksberg's result and ours is the presence of
sentential context in our experiment: the context may have
sufficiently supported comprehension of a following metaphor
in our experiment so that the semantic manipulation aid not
affect the target comprehension. Perhaps the context made
the meaning of a metaphor so apparent that subjects may not
have needed much help from a prime.
Experiment 2
The second experiment was designed to test the possibi-
lity that the prime in Experiment 1 did not facilitate
target metaphor comprehension because the context already
set up a ground that enabled target comprehension. If it is
the case, the prime should affect the ease of target compre-
hension in the absence of the context, in order to avoid a
possible spillover effect from reading a priming sentence to
cancel a possible facilitative effect, we also removed the
priming sentence. Only a word, semant ical ly related cr
unrelated to the following metaphor, was presented prior to
that metaphor. The subjects' task was still to read a
sentence for comprehension.
Because we no longer used a sentence for a prime, there
was no way to differentiate a Specific-Figurative prime from
a Specific-Literal prime; we used only one kind, a Specific
prime. The General-Literal prime of Experiment 1 will be
referred to as a General prime. In place of a neutral
prime, the word "blank" was used. We added a new type of
prime in which a word was semantically related to the topic
of the following metaphor (Topic prime). This was done to
compare topic and vehicle priming effects on comprehension
of a metaphor. As a result, we had four priming conditions
as before. For example, when the target metaphor is "Mary's
marriage was an icebox.", subjects read a word "cold" prior
tc it in the specific prime condition, "warm" in the
general, or "bridal" in the topic prime condition. The word
was always "blank" in the blank prime condition.
The prime may affect either an encoding or a subsequent
comprehension stage. A separate experiment unreported here
in detail has provided evidence that the specific prime is
not lexically related to the vehicle whereas the topic prime
is to the topic. if encoding is the primary locus of the
faellitative effect on understanding a target, then the
topic prime should reduce metaphor reading times mere than
the specific prime. As the general prime is less strongly
associated to the vehicle than the specific prime, it should
reduce metaphor reading times less than the specific prime
and the topic prime. Alternatively if the primary locus of
the facilitation is in the comprehension stage, then the
specific prime should have greater effect on target compre-
hension than the topic prime, because only the former is
related to the sentential meaning of a metaphor. However,
the topic prime may show a small advantage over the blank
prime by reducing the time for encoding.
Gildea & Glucksberg's (1983) data supported the idea
that priming the semantic field in general is as effective
as priming the specific value of the semantic field (SL=GL).
If it is true, then the general prime should be as effective
as the specific prime in reducing time spent in the compre-
hension stage (G=S). Alternatively if the semantic related-
ness is the main facilitative factor in comprehension stage,
the specific prime should reduce metaphor reading times more
than the general prime.
For example, when a target metaphor is "Mary's marriage
is an icebox.", the prime "cold" would pinpoint what is the
appropriate feature of an icebox to attach to marriage. An
icebox is a container to reserve perishables, and it may
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need electricity. When the prime is "warn,", it suggests the
relevant semantic field of the metaphor ground, namely the
temperature, but an icebox is hardly warm. Thus this prime
would not help selection of the appropriate feature: it may
be rather confusing in relation to the metaphor ground.
Therefore it is possible that this prime slows oown the
target comprehension. The reading times after the general
prime may be even slower than after the blank for this
reason. Thus the effect of the general prime relative to
the blank is not immediately clear.
£'G£nocJ
SJjbjectjj, Forty-eight University of Massachusetts
undergraduates participated in the experiment in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement.
Materials. Subject read a priming word before a target
sentence; an example of the prime conditions was:
(Specific prime) cold
(General prime) warm
(Base line) blank
(Topic prime) bridal
The target sentence was either metaphorical or literal
and a subject read all experimental target sentence either
in metaphorical or literal condition. An example of each
type is shown below:
(Metaphor) Mary's marriage is an icebox.
(Literal) Mary's marriage is Disastrous.
A metaphor sentence typically consisted of a proper
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name, and two nouns which did net have a category-instance
relation between them. A literal sentence was a paraphrase
of the metaphor, and it shared the same proper name and the
subject noun phrase. Instead of the vehicle, the literal
parapnrase had an adjective to complete a sentence. The
adjective was selected so that the sentence preserved the
gist of the metaphor and that the adjective was not semanti-
cally related to the metaphor ground. A separate norming
study provided evidence that metaphorical targets were more
difficult to understand than their literal paraphrases when
presented in isolation. This difference was highly signifi-
cant (P<0.01).
Subjects read a total of 44 wo rd- sent ence pairs, 4
practice, 20 experimental, and 20 filler materials. The
experimental and filler materials were randomly ordered, and
the same order was preserved throughout the experiment.
Filler materials were constructed the same way as the
experimental material. Filler sentences were used such that
when subjects read experimental targets in the metaphorical
condition, they read the filler sentences in the literal
condition, and vice versa. Counterbalancing the target and
the prime conditions resulted in eight material sets.
The experimental materials were again derived from the
Gildea & Glucksberg (1933) study. Their combination of
prime, topic, and vehicle was preserved with minor excep-
tions. Changes were made when a word in their material had
46
a very low frequency count in the word frequency norm
(Kucera & Francis, 1967) and when the experimenters felt
that subjects might not understand the word meaning.
The specific prime was the same as the Specific-
Figurative and Specific-Literal primes (SF and SL) ; the
general prime was the same as the General-Literal prima (GL)
in Experiment 1. in place of the neutral prime (K) in the
previous experiment, the word "blank" was used to establish
a base line. The topic prime consisted of words that were
judged to be semantically related to the topic but unrelated
to the metaphor ground of the target metaphor.
Procedure.,. Subjects were run individually in an experi-
mental session that lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Subjects saw a brief presentation of a prime word, read a
sentence, and answered a comprehension question.
All the materials were displayed on a video monitor
which was controlled by a Zenith Z10 0 microcomputer.
Subjects engaged in their task in one room while the experi-
menter supervised the progress of the experiment in an
adjacent room using another video monitor and an intercom.
Each trial began with the wora "READY" on the screen.
Subjects pressed a response trigger to initiate the presen-
tation. A prime word immediately replaced the word "READY"
and remained on the screen for 3 50 msec. Then a target
sentence replaced the word and subjects read it, then pres-
sed the trigger when they understood it. Reacing time for
the sentence was automatically recorded by the computer.
4 7
After reading a target sentence, a row cf question marks
signaled to subjects the onset of a comprehension question.
A question appeared on the screen replacing the question
marks after one second. Subjects gave either a "Yes" or
"110" response orally through the intercom; the experimenter
gave them immediate feedback and recorded their responses.
Subjects were instructed to pay attention to the words
as well as to the sentences because some of the words were
related to the following sentences ana they would help
comprehend the sentences. it was made clear in the instruc-
tion that the word "blank" was never related to the follo-
wing sentence so that subjects would net try to relate the
were "blank" to the following sentence.
The comprehension questions were used to ensure that
subjects understand sentences before pressing the trigger.
Most cf them were simple paraphrases of the target senten-
ces. When subjects gave a wrong answer, the experimenter
asked them to explain how they arrived at their answer.
Subjects answered in a few sentences describing their reaso-
ning. This was done to further ensure that subjects would
do their best to comprehend the sentences.
J2e_s;ul t s and Discussion
nil
'he overall average reading time for the first 48
subjects was 2230 msec with a standard deviation of 601
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msec. Twelve subjects were replaced because reading times
for at least two out of the five items in at least one
condition exceeded 4033 msec, three standard deviations
above the mean. Reading times of under 700 msec were omit-
ted from the data (3 out of 1920, 0.16%). The resulting
average reading times are presented as a function of target
and prime in Table 5.
Table 5
Clean Reading Times (in msec) of Target Sentence
as a Function of Target and Prime
in Experiment 2
Target type S
Prime
G
type
B T Ave rage
Metaphorical 2293 2627 2404 2516 2460
Literal 1S67 2031 1837 1967 1 926
Average 2080 23 29 2121 2242 2193
The metaphorical target sentences were read slower than
the literal paraphrases, and this was true for all prime
types. An analysis of variance showed this effect to be
significant ( Fl ( 1 , 4 3 ) =1 3 . 71 3 , P<0.01, F 2 ( 1 , 3 8 ) = 3 5 . 8 9 0 ,
P< 0 . 0 1 ) . The effect of the pri m e on target reading times
was also significant (Fl(3,41)=6.334, P < 0 . 0 1
,
F2(3,36)=3.357, P<0.02). The interaction between the target
and the prime was far from significant (F1,F2{1).
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Donferroni t-statistics for planned comparisons revealed
the cetailed picture of the effect of the prime. First, a
target sentence was read faster after the specific prime
than after the general prime (t (1 , 4 3) =3 .91 7
,
P<0.01). This
is contradictory to what Gildea & Glucksberg (1983) found in
their paradigm. The second finding was that a target sente-
nce was read faster after the blank prime than after the
general prime (t (1 ,4 3) =3.309
,
P<0.05). A target sentence
was read faster after the blank prime than after the topic
prime, though this difference missed the significance level
of P = 0.10 (t (1 ,4 3) =2.297) .
When metaphors only were considered, the prime had
significant effect on target reading times (Fl (3,1 8) =3.333,
P<0.05). Metaphors were read significantly faster after the
specific primes than after the general primes
(tl (1 , 20 ) =3.1 91 , P<0.05). Metaphors were reaa faster after
the blank prime than after the general prime; though this
effect was not significant (t (1 ,20) =2.256
,
P>0.10). Metap-
hors were also read faster after the blank prime than after
the topic prime, however, neither was this effect signifi-
cant (t (1 ,20) =1 .455) . These results suggested that the
general and the topic primes interfered with the subsequent
comprehension of metaphors. A result of item analysis
provided the same pattern with lesser significance.
When only literal target sentences were considered, the
prime showed the same trend in the effect on target reading
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times as when the targets were metaphors; however, the
magnitude of the effect was smaller (Fl (3,1 8) -2.56 9
,
P<0.0G). none of the subsequent pairwise comparisons reac-
hed the significance level of P=0.1C.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
How do seman-tically related primes affect metaphor
comprehension in the absence of sentential context? Our
secono experiment answered this question with interesting
results. Indeed, semantically related primes did affect
metaphor comprehension compared to the base line, but did
not necessarily facilitate it. A facilitative effect, if
any, was observed only when the prime was related to the
following metaphor through the metaphor ground. When the
primes were related to a metaphor differently, their effects
were rather opposite: they interfered with comprehension of
the metaphor. It seems that subjects had substantial diffi-
culty in understanding a metaphor when a prime guided their
attention to a concept different from the metaphor ground.
The fact that metaphors were read slowly after the
general and the topic primes compared to after the blank
suggests that subjects were trying to integrate the metap-
hors with the preceding words. This integration process
must have been at work also when a prime was the specific
one. It appears that the specific prime reduced the time
for selection of an appropriate feature of the vehicle, the
metaphor ground, but the process of integration dulled its
facilitative effect compared to the base line.
The comparison between the specific prime and the topic
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prime supportec the importance of sentential comprehension
in understanding a metaphor. The topic prime was lexically
related to the topic, while the specific prime was not
related to the vehicle. if encoding is the primary locus of
facilitative effect, then the topic prime should be more
effective than the specific prime in reducing metaphor
reading times. The result was opposite: the topic prime
created an interference effect whereas the specific prime
had a small facilitative effect. The specific prime aid not
ease encoding of the vehicle, however, it appears to have
eased the comprehension stage. The effects of two primes
were clearly different on the overall comprehension of a
metaphor. It suggests that encoding is net the primary
locus of the priming effect.
In an effort to describe the difference among the prime
effects, we have introduced three components of the compre-
hension mechanism: encoding, selection, and integration.
Let us briefly redefine each component here. By "encoding"
we mean perceptual encoding of a target sentence. Selection
is defined as selection of an appropriate feature of the
vehicle (or predicate) to attach to the topic (subject).
Integration occurs when more than one word meaning is
combined. We feel that there is one more component in
comprehension of a target sentence when there is a word
prime to preceed the target: retrieval of -che prime word.
It is necessary if the prime word is to be integrated to the
target sentence.
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Different combinations of four components may explain
the different effects of the prin.es on target comprehension.
A possible combination is shown in Table 6. We do not
intend to claim sequent ial i ty of components in this order
except for the case where a plus sign is usee.
Table 6
Comprehension Mechanisms
as a Function of Prime
Prime Comprehension components
Specif ic (E), (R), (I)
General (E)
,
(R), (I) + (S), (I)
Topic (E), (R), (I) + (S), (I)
Blank (E), (S), (I)
(E) Encoding of a target
(R) Retrieval of a prime word
(S) Selection of a feature
(I) Integration of word meaning
When a specific prime preceeds a target sentence,
subjects first encode the target and retrieve the prime
word. Because the prime is the appropriate feature of the
vehicle to attach to the topic, the integration words would
take place smoothly and successfully. In contrast, when a
preceding word is either a general or a topic prime, this
integration fails. Warm-marriage-icebox, Bridal-marriage-
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icebox? subjects have to select an appropriate feature of
the vehicle themselves and try to integrate their, after the
initial integration fails. They may have to repeat this
process mote than once if the second try is also unsucces-
sful.
Though neither is easy, the general prime and the topic
prime may affect target comprehension slightly differently.
The general prime directs subjects' attention to the right
semantic field of the ground, but there is a contradiction
attached to it (e.g. w a cm- icebox-col c) . As a result,
subjects may decide to ignore this semantic field and try to
find a different, but meaningful one fruitlessly. Or even
if they do not discard this semantic field, resolving the
contradiction may take some time. The task of integration
may be somewhat simpler with the topic prime, as it is not
related to the metaphor ground. Though this prime is equal-
ly not helpful for fincing the appropriate feature for
integration, it certainly does not offer a contradiction.
This offers a plausible explanation, however, we do not have
a clear understanding of how two primes differed in creating
an interference effect. ll either the difference between
their effects on metaphor reading times in Experiment 2 was
significant
.
A very different thing may be happening when a prime is
the "blank". After encoding the target sentence, it is not
necessary to retrieve the prime word. Selection of an
appropriate feature of the vehicle and integration would
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occur directly following the encoding. Because there is
clue as to what feature is appropriate, subjects may choose
the most salient feature of the vehicle and try to integrate
the topic and the vehicle, it is no accident that the most
salient feature of the vehicle is often the metaphor ground
(e.g. cold for icebox). Thus integration can be as smooth
as the one in the specific prime condition. In this model,
their relative effects upon comprehension times are not
immediately clear. Their effects did not differ reliably in
our experiment, either. To resolve this issue, the model
requires further specification.
Cur experiment has shown that target comprehension took
longer after the general prime than after the specific
prime. We have argued that integration difficulties account
for this. Then why did the two primes show the same effect
on judgment time in Gildea & Glucksberg's study? We note
that their judgment task involves a decision stage in
addition to the encoding and comprehension stages we have
described above. In other words, subjects decided whether a
sentence was literally true or not against seme criteria
after they understood the sentence.
When a prime was the specific one a longer latency may
have been produced in the decision stage as Gildea &
Glucksberg assumed: because the metaphorical truth inter-
fered with the literalness. When a prime was the general
one, the comprehension stage may have been slowed down as we
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have shown in out expe ciraent ; it does not necessarily entail
that the metaphor was under qt-nnri ni,„„ .< .mj^L^ooa. inus the two primes may
have exhibited the same overall effect on target comprehen-
sion by quite different mechanisms. However, as our model
does not encompass the decision stage, it can not acount for
other findings by Gilaea & Glucksberc in their metaphor
interference paradigm.
The last point, but not least important, is that the
prime had a similar effect on metaphors and on literal
sentences. The fact that its magnitude was greater with
metaphors than with literal sentences seems reasonable given
the difference between them in comprehension difficulty.
Our metaphors were more difficult to understand than their
literal paraphrases; therefore- the prime could have had more
influence on metaphor comprehension. But how couid the
peine influence comprehension of literal sentences if their
sentential meanings were relatively clear?
When someone says "Mary's marriage is disastrous." we
may immediately understand that her marriage is unhappy.
However, the way her marriage is unhappy is not readily
apparent. Mary's marriage can be in financial trouble, or
her mother-in-law may be distressing her. Uhen this same
sentence is preceded by the word "cold", we may arrive at a
more precise knowledge of Mary's marital problem: the inter-
personal relation is cold. Thus it is possible that selec-
tion of an appropriate feature in comprehension of a literal
sentence may proceed in the same way as the metaphor ground
57
is selected in metaphoc comprehension. The fact that the
prime affected both literal and metaphorical comprehension
similarly strongly suggests that comprehension mechansisms
may be very similar.
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APPENDIX A
The sentential contexts, priming sentence, and target
sentences for each passage are presentend. The priming
sentences appear in the following order: Specific-
Figurative, Specific-Literal, General-Literal, anc Neutral.Target sentences appear in the following order: metaphorical
anc. literal. The semantically related words in priminq
sentences are underlined.
1 Bob and Mary's marriage was ending.
They seldom talked to each other these days.
The happy past was a fading memory.
She remembered the first time they met.
She had been feeling unhappy then,
because people arcund her were cold,
because that winter was very cold,
because that summer was very hot.
because people around her were sad.
Now, her marriage was an icebox.
Now, her marriage was disastrous.
2 Phil's cat was very selective about her food.
She ate only fresh fillet of fish.
She ate little and left the rest untouched.
Phil's wife complained to him about it.
tie thought his wife was spoiled.
He thought the fish was spoiled
.
He wanted to keep the fish f_resh.
He thought his wife was unfair.
His cat was a princess.
His cat was very fussy.
3 Sandy saw her housemate repairing his old car.
She said hello and smiled at him.
He came to her, throwing his screw driver away.
He murmured something, and crabbed her arm.
Eis remarks were very sha_r,2.
His fingernails were s h ajcQ .
His fingernails were dull.
His remarks were quite rude.
His smile was a razor.
His smile frightened her.
Ann had a job cleaning house.
There were a lot of rats where she worked.
She hatea her job, because she hated rats.
There was one again at the bottom of a jarShe had to kill it, but it would be messy.
taring at the rat, she felt trap^d.
The rat was unlucky to be trapp^d-
The rat struggled hard to be £x ee. '.
She wouldn't dare to touch the rat.
Her job was a jail.
Her job was boring.
The day of Mary's operation was approaching.
She was becoming nervous about it.
She heard negative things about the surgeon.
His fingers were exude.
H is manners were exude
.
He was obsessively neat.
He was very unpleasant.
They said the surgeon was a butcher.
They said the surgeon was incompetent.
Judy went to her boyfriend's house.
They planned to do homework together.
He complained that it was difficult.
There were papers all over his desk.
She thought that his ideas were me_§sy.
She thought that his bedroom was messy.
She thought his bedroom should be tidy.
She looked for the assignment paper.
His desk was a junkyard.
His desk was disorganized.
Their new electric bulbs were a big failure.
They were losing the market to a competitor.
They held a meeting to find good ideas.
A young manager thought of a new product.
His presentation was just bxillisnt.
The glow of his bulb was bx i111 an t
.
The glow of the eld bulb was dim.
His presentation was successful.
His idea was a diamond.
His idea may save them.
66
o Slums present problem that can be complicated
Criminals tend to hide there from the policeEaucation and hygiene are below standard.
The streets are very unhealthy,
The people there are unhealthy.,
Only the mice there are healthy,
The people are always hungry,
and the criminals are germs,
and the criminals thrive there.
9 The tourist's drive was turning out to oe a disaster.
It seemed they had lost their way.
They hadn't seen a wide road for a while.
The driver alone seemed peculiarly calm.
They became suspicious of his intention.
They thought the driver was crooked.
The trees around them were crooked.
The trees stood tall and st.raic.ht.
The trees Stood tall and thick.
The roads were snakes.
The roads were dangerous.
10 Winter was coming quickly this year.
It began snowing heavily a few days ago.
Icicles hung from the trees.
Everyone went into the forest for wood.
The winter was sharp.
The axes were shaxp.
The axes were dull.
The axes were heavy.
The icicles were swords.
The icicles were dangerous.
11 Joe got a job at a high school.
He didn't like the office schedule.
He wrote memos suggesting changes.
The administration responded to him.
The hours there were impersonal
.
Their letters were impersonal
.
All the teachers were fxlencLly.
He explained his idea to them.
The office was an iceberg.
The office was unpleasant.
Ed bought stocks while going to college.
Eut^his stocks didn't make money at all"
He did well academically for four years*
He received his diploma with honors.
His college years were investment^.
The stocks he bought were investments.
The stocks he bought were worthless.
His college years had been pleasant.'
The diploma was money.
The diploma was precious.
Kate was cooking a pie for dessert.
She opened the oven and burned her fingers.
Her husband, John, laughed at her carelessness.
She cooled her finger with running water.
She didn't want to hear his critical words now.
His opinions were gainful.
The burns were gainful.
Th e w a t e r w a s coraf orting
.
The wounds looked terrible.
John's words were daggers.
John's words were harsh.
Ray and Joan decided to take turns making suppe
Ray hated cooking with all his heart.
He never made supper without problems.
One day his supper was particularly bad.
Joan criticized Ray's cooking.
Her expression was frozen.
Her meat was still frozen.
Her soup was sizzling hot.
Her soup was oddly sour.
Ray thought she was made of ice.
Ray thought she was very unkind.
The salesman kept explaining his products.
But Ron didn't want any of them.
He wanted the man to leave his house.
Ron tried asking him to leave in a mild way.
Ron's words needed to be more a^cycessive.
Ron's tactic was far from acj cj_r e s s i ve,
.
Ron's tactic must have been passive.
Ron's tactic wasn't effective at all.
The salesman was a bulldozer.
The salesman was relentless.
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16 The chile looked a little tired and feverish.His mother sent him to bed early after supper.Sne tuckeo him m and patted his head gentlyShe sang a song while he fell asleep.
The sight of her was soothing.
The cool crisp sheet felt soothing.
The fever was less il^itatinc.
The boy dozed off into a dream.
The mother's songs were medicine.
The mother's songs sounded lovely.
17 Allen's family were driving on the highway.
Their car was stuck in a Sunday traffic jam.
The cars crawled forward only very slowly.
People around them were already impatient.
They beeped their horns repeatedly".
Everyone's nerves began sc.xeami.ng.
People in the cars began scxe ami na
.
Allen wished the cars would be slient
.
Allen tried to ignore the beeping.
The highway was a zoo.
The highway was noisy.
18 Jane overslept her first class this morning.
She jumped out of bed and dressed in a second.
She tied her shoe laces hastily and clumsily.
She bolted out of her room without combing her hair
She was very upset about being late fcr the class.
Her morning was becoming tangled.
Her shoe laces were a little tancjled.
Her hat was not on quite straight.
She should have gone to bed earlier.
Her hair was still spagetti.
Her hair looked very messy.
IS Sally skipped classes often with her friends.
Her parents would have been enraged if they had known.
One day her father called her into the study.
Her father stared at her violently.
Her father shut the door violently.
Her father shut the door silently.
Her father shut the door in a hurry.
His rage was a volcano.
His rage was apparent.
Tina went to New York city for the first time,
tier f ciena aid net show up at the train station,
ohe had>to take the subway to the friend's placeShe felt unsure about how to get there by he reel
Her feelings became complicated.
The map of the city looked complicated.
Her friend's explanation was too simple.
She had to ask directions repeatedly.
The 'Jew York subway was a maze.
The new York subway was confusing.
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APPENDIX B
The prime words appear in the following order: SpecificGeneral, ana Topic. A metaphorical target sentence isfollowed by a literal parapfrase.
r ound/thin/hunc ry
Danny's stomach is a barrel.
Danny's stomach is stuffed.
spoil ed/f re sh/f ur ry
Phil's cat is a princess.
Phil's cat is very fussy.
crude /neat/medical
Some surgeons are butchers.
Some surgeons are incompetent.
brill iant/dim/thoughtf ul
Tony's idea is a diamond.
Tony's idea is excellent.
noi sy/ silent/commercial
The highway was a zoo.
The h i g hw ay w a s j amm e d
.
messy/tidy/old
Judy's desk is a junkyard.
Judy's desk is unorganized.
sooth ing/i r r i tating/dext r ious
Mothers' hands are medicine.
Mothers' hands are helpful.
unhealthy/heal thy/di shone st
Criminals are germs.
Criminals are spreading.
col c/w arm/bridal
Mary's marriage is an icebox.
Mary's marriage is unhappy.
irapet Eonal/f r iendly/busine ss
Joe's office is an iceberg.
Joe's office is unpleasant.
dangerous/ safe/paved
This road is a snake.
This road is winding.
violent/peaceful /angry
Ron's rage was a volcano.
Ron's rage was apparent.
sharp/dull/f rozen
Icicles are knives.
Icicles are dangerous.
t rapped/f ree/cle rical
Ann 's job is a jail.
Ann's job is boring.
sharp/dull/ laughing
Sandy's smile is a razor.
Sandy's smile is frightening.
precious/wor thle ss/graduate
Ed's diploma was money.
Ed's diploma was important.
private/open/merciful
Kate's heart is a closet.
Kate's heart is lonely.
tangled/straight/blond
Jane's hair was spaghetti.
Jane's hair was very messy.
pai nf ul/comforting/verbal
John's words are daggers.
John's words are harsh.
aggressive/passive/ travelling
That salesman is a bulldoze
That salesman is very pushy


